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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-4162 
___________ 
  
SUMINDA JAYASUNDERA, 
                                               Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 AIMEE GARCIA, Vice/President, Human Resources; PETER MELAS;  
MAURIZIO SCROFANI; MACY'S INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. 2-16-cv-05084) 
District Court Judge:  Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2017 
 
Before: RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 7, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Suminda Jayasundera appeals the District Court’s order compelling him to 
arbitrate his claims that Macy’s, his former employer, discriminated against him.  We 
will affirm. 
 In 2014, Jayasundera filed a lawsuit—the first in what would become three 
separate lawsuits—against Macy’s, claiming discrimination during his employment 
there.1  Macy’s moved to compel arbitration.  The District Court ruled that Jayasundera 
and Macy’s had entered into a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate certain 
employment disputes, and that the discrimination claims in Jayasundera’s lawsuit were 
within the scope of that agreement.  Accordingly, the District Court granted the motion to 
compel arbitration and dismissed Jayasundera’s claims from federal court.  He did not 
appeal from that order.2 
Two years later, Jayasundera filed the lawsuit at issue here against Macy’s and 
several of its employees.  He claimed that Defendants continued to discriminate against 
him, which ultimately led to his constructive termination.  The District Court again 
compelled arbitration.  The District Court ruled that because it had already determined 
that Jayasundera and Macy’s had entered into a valid and binding arbitration agreement, 
he was collaterally estopped from arguing otherwise.  The District Court also ruled that 
                                              
1 That lawsuit was docketed in the District Court as Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-07455. 
2 Instead, Jayasundera presented his claims in arbitration.  After the arbitrator found his 
claims meritless, he filed a second lawsuit in the District Court seeking to set aside the 
arbitrator’s decision.  The District Court declined to do so. 
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his new claims likewise fell within the agreement’s scope.  Thus, the court compelled the 
parties to arbitration and dismissed the complaint.  Jayasundera appeals.3 
On appeal, as he did in the District Court, Jayasundera argues that he did not agree 
to arbitrate his employment disputes with Macy’s.  The District Court correctly rejected 
that argument under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.  Collateral estoppel bars a party to 
an earlier action from litigating an issue in a later action if (1) the identical issue was 
previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) it was determined by a 
final and valid judgment; and (4) that determination was essential to the prior judgment.  
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231–32 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  In Jayasundera’s first lawsuit against Macy’s, the District Court determined 
the precise issue that is dispositive here—whether he entered into a valid and binding 
arbitration agreement.  That issue was briefed by both parties, was the crux of the 
litigation in the District Court, and was the reason Jayasundera’s first case was dismissed.  
See id.  Therefore, the District Court properly concluded that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel barred him from arguing that he never agreed to arbitrate claims stemming from 
his employment with Macy’s.4 
                                              
3 The District Court’s order was final under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3), and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 215 (3d Cir. 
2003).  We review de novo the District Court’s decision to compel arbitration.  Kaneff v. 
Del. Title Loans, Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009).   
4 Jayasundera does not argue on appeal that the District Court erred in ruling that his 
claims fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.  Accordingly, we will not 
address that ruling.  See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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Jayasundera argues that collateral estoppel should not apply because (1) Macy’s, 
in the first lawsuit, submitted fabricated and misleading evidence to prove the existence 
of the arbitration agreement; and (2) he opted out of the arbitration agreement late in 
2015.  While we have recognized that in certain cases we might decline to apply 
collateral estoppel if newly discovered evidence becomes available, see Cowgill v. 
Raymark Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 798, 804 (3d Cir. 1987), this is not such a case.   
As to Jayasundera’s claim that Macy’s used fraudulent evidence, he could have, 
but did not, object to the allegedly made up evidence when he opposed arbitration during 
the first lawsuit.  See, e.g., Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 167 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (“once an issue is raised and determined, it is the entire issue that is 
precluded, not just the particular arguments raised in support of it in the first case”).  In 
any event, Jayasundera has produced no evidence to support his claims that Macy’s 
fabricated evidence in the first case.  Jayasundera’s second argument—that he opted out 
of the arbitration agreement after his first lawsuit was dismissed, but before he filed this 
lawsuit—is irrelevant.  Under the plain language of the arbitration agreement and its opt-
out election form, Jayasundera had thirty days—but no more—from the date he was hired 
to opt out of arbitration.  His time to opt out expired in 2009, and he could not, as he 
attempted to do, opt out over six years later.   
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s decision to compel 
arbitration.  
